![\"shutterstock_176631083\"](\"http:\/\/21stcenturylearners.org.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/10\/shutterstock_176631083-1024x575.jpg\")
<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
In the previous post<\/a><\/span><\/strong> I made an argument for the educational importance of dialogue, suggesting that it has value both as a means of education and as an educational endpoint in its own right. I have also suggested (following the ideas of Rupert Wegerif<\/strong>) that dialogue, or dialogic thinking, is an integral part of gaining conceptual understanding. In this post I try to offer\u00a0some challenge to the idea that it is not possible, or at least not valuable, to teach \u2018general thinking skills<\/strong>\u2019 which, I argue, emerge from dialogues.<\/p>\n These recent posts by Carl Hendrick<\/a><\/span><\/strong> and David Didau<\/a><\/strong><\/span>, and this oft-cited article by Daniel Willingham<\/a><\/strong><\/span> are representative of the arguments against teaching thinking skills. They all stress\u00a0that critical thinking is dependent on subject knowledge. When solving a problem in mathematics or designing an experiment in science general thinking skills are insufficient<\/strong>; an in-depth knowledge of the relevant subject-matter is required. Willingham says:<\/p>\n \u201cThe processes of thinking are intertwined with the content of thought (that is, domain knowledge). Thus, if you remind a student to \u2018look at an issue from multiple perspectives\u2019 often enough, he will learn that he ought to do so, but if he doesn\u2019t know much about an issue, he can\u2019t think about it from multiple perspectives.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Willingham goes on to consider a particular kind of critical thinking: problem solving. He focuses on the need to look for the \u2018deep structure\u2019 in a problem (to connect the problem to the knowledge needed to solve it) to avoid being confused by its surface structure (the context of the problem). Willingham acknowledges that self-regulation of thinking can help; reminding yourself that there probably is a deep structure and you ought to look for it will increase your chances of solving a problem. However, he again stresses that this \u2018thinking skill\u2019 is insufficient \u2013 without a depth of domain-specific knowledge you will not be able to recognise the deep-structure and solve the problem.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n This \u2018inter-subjective orientation<\/strong>\u2019 is a precondition for reason to emerge in a dialogue, but is not in itself sufficient and is complemented by a set of \u2018ground-rules\u2019 which describe effective dialogic reasoning. These ground rules are not fixed, but evolving and are partially determined by the needs of each situation and by a sense of care for those with whom we dialogue. The ground rules might include questioning assumptions and responding to challenges with reasons. <\/p>\n Further Reading<\/strong><\/p>\n Wegerif, R. (2004). Towards an account of teaching general thinking skills that is compatible with the assumptions of sociocultural theory. Theory and Research in Education, 2(2), 143-159.<\/p>\n Wegerif, Rupert (2005) Reason and creativity in classroom dialogues. Language and Education, 19, (3), 223-238 (available online here<\/a><\/span><\/strong>)<\/p>\n See also Rupert’s recent blog posts here <\/a><\/strong><\/span>and here<\/a><\/span><\/strong>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" In the previous post I made an argument for the educational importance of dialogue, suggesting that it has value both as a means of education and as an educational endpoint in its own right. I have also suggested (following the ideas of Rupert Wegerif) that dialogue, or dialogic thinking, is an integral part of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-859","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"yoast_head":"\n
\nIn his article, David Didau emphasises that the way to get better at solving problems (in maths, for example) is to acquire lots of subject knowledge and then to have repeated practice at applying it in different contexts within the same subject; the critical thinking needed to solve maths problems is developed through experience of solving maths problems. He also argues that the subsequently enhanced ability to solve problems in maths will not lead to better problem solving in other disciplines as it is dependent on\u00a0subject knowledge. This view is supported from the perspective of\u00a0neuro-science in another recent blog by\u00a0Mike Hobbis<\/a>s<\/span><\/strong>.<\/p>\n
\nThese authors are arguing that \u2018generic\u2019 thinking skills such as seeking different perspectives or looking for deep structure in problems are not sufficient for solving problems and making valid judgements in a given field; these things\u00a0are dependent on a depth of subject knowledge. I agree<\/strong>. But I wonder whether there is an inter-dependency<\/strong> here, and I want to draw attention to\u00a0arguments that subject knowledge alone is also insufficient for good thinking and is dependent on general or dialogic<\/strong> thinking skills, which can and should be taught. In what follows I am again drawing heavily on the writing of Rupert Wegerif<\/strong> (see further reading).<\/p>\n
\nEvidence that teaching children to get better at dialogue (through dialoguing around substantive content) leads to improved performance in different domains is provided by the Philosophy for Children<\/strong> (P4C) and Thinking Together<\/strong> approaches. In a recent EEF study<\/a><\/span><\/strong>, regular P4C practice was found to lead to an additional two months of progress in maths and reading among 7-11 year-olds in England. P4C and Thinking Together are social practices. One possible way of explaining their impact is to view \u2018thinking skills\u2019 as being situated in dynamic\u00a0social interactions<\/strong> and dialogues and not in the static internal mental mechanisms of the individual.<\/p>\n
\nThis idea has its grounding in theories such as Wittgenstein\u2019s language games (the meaning of language resides in the way it is used in particular social situations and cultural practices) and Vygotsky’s social development\u00a0(all that is internal in the higher mental functions was once external, and is an internalised version of social interactions). But the idea\u00a0of thinking and reasoning being situated in social interactions and specific cultural practices or language games presents a challenge to the idea of teaching general thinking skills: the only skills to be learned are learned within specific cultural practices (mathematics for example) and are not transferable. This seems to support Didau\u2019s argument and to provide theoretical support for the evidence he cites.<\/p>\n
\nChallenges have been offered to this conclusion, however. It seems to follow from the arguments outlined above that \u2018truths\u2019 and indeed morals can only exist within cultural practices and language games \u2013 there can be no universal truths or morals. Yet if that were true any statement along the lines that \u2018thinking skills exist only in specific practices or domains\u2019 cannot be a universal truth \u2013 it too must belong to a particular language game (this is a performative contradiction). Furthermore, the\u00a0theory cannot easily account for ways in which cultural practices are criticised and changed or transcended.<\/p>\n
\nThe social philosopher Jurgen Habermas<\/strong> pointed out that there must be features that are common to dialogues in different cultural contexts; at the very least there must be a belief that the outcome can be determined by the better argument, otherwise no-one could sincerely engage in debate. From this it emerges that reason, or at least being reasonable<\/strong>, is more a matter of the way people orientate themselves to each other in dialogues than it is a matter of determinate logic or use of language. A willingness to negotiate differences in world view \u2013 to engage in reason across difference<\/strong>, or dialogue \u2013 allows new understandings to emerge between\u00a0different cultural perspectives (and allows us to explain transcendence and transfer).<\/p>\n
\nSo now we have a description of reason (or general thinking skills) living in dialogues \u2013 dialogic reasoning<\/strong>. Both Vygotskian theory and empirical evidence suggest that such reasoning is internalised by participants in dialogues, who become more reasonable individuals and better thinkers. Teaching general thinking skills becomes a matter of inducting children into these dialogues, helping them to develop appropriate orientations to the other and helping them to take ownership of the ground rules that make the dialogue reasonable (this is exactly what P4C and Thinking Together do<\/strong>).<\/p>\n
\nOf course dialogic reason is not sufficient, but it can be seen as\u00a0the yin to the yang of domain-specific knowledge. When we are faced with a new problem or an alien perspective it gives us a way to move forward or \u2018go on\u2019 – we can reason across difference and through dialogue generate fresh perspectives and make meaning from our knowledge.<\/p>\n
\nIt might be claimed that these social orientations and ground rules are easily and inevitably learned as we become socialised; it might be claimed that they are \u2018biologically primary<\/strong>\u2019 \u2013 we are pre-programmed to acquire them. But do we need to look further than the recent Brexit debate, or the current presidential election campaign in the United States, to realise that this is not so? How we respond when we encounter that which is other (be that a different perspective on religion or happiness or a different understanding of dynamic equilibrium) is essential to our capacity to reason and to learn. Teaching children to get better at dialogue is a profoundly important educational aim \u2013 and the subject of my next post.<\/p>\n
\nIf you aren\u2019t convinced by my layperson’s interpretation of these arguments\u00a0I would urge you to read Rupert Wegerif\u2019s work\u00a0yourself \u2013 to seek out a perspective different to your own and seek to understand it (by engaging in dialogue around it and developing your domain-specific knowledge) and see if there is anything to be learned from it. This is an important thinking skill, and one that transfers to many situations!<\/p>\n